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BIANNUAL SURVEY
CPLR 302(a)(1): New York contract unnecessary for
"transaction of business."
Prior to the Court of Appeals' decision in Longines-Wittnauer
Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, Inc.,41 the lower courts were not unanimous
in holding that a New York contract is not an essential element
of a cause of action based upon CPLR 302(a) (1).12 The de-
fendant in Longines, after preliminary negotiations in New York,
executed a contract in Illinois for the sale of its machines. Officers
and engineers of the defendant twice entered New York and,
subsequently, its engineers worked at the plaintiff's New York
plant readying the machines. A supplementary agreement, in-
creasing the price, was also executed in this state. In refuting
the defendant's contention that the contract had to be made in
New York to sustain jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1), the
Court held that "even though the last act marking the formal
execution of the contract may not have occurred within New York,
the statutory test may be satisfied by a showing of other purposeful
acts performed by the appellant in the State in relation to the
contract, albeit preliminary or subsequent to its execution." 43
Thus, the answer to the question of whether jurisdiction can
be asserted under CPLR 302(a) (1) involves not merely the
place where the contract was executed, but rather "turns on the
totality of the defendant's activities within the forum." 4 4  Provided
that the cause of action arises out of business activities in New
York,4 r the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process
requirements will be met.4
In Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet Co.,4 7 the plaintiff, who acted
as defendant's sales agent in New York, commenced an action
for breach of a contract of employment. The defendant, a Georgia
corporation, had utilized the plaintiff's services to increase the
company's sales volume in the New York area. The appellate
division held that this was clearly a proper situation for the
application of CPLR 302(a) (1), since the plaintiff's activities in
this state as the defendant's agent must be attributed to the
41 15 N.Y2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
42
,E.g., Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 73, 247 N.Y.S.2d
743, 748 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (contract made in New York necessary to .satisfy
CPLR 302(a) (1)); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 248
N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (contract executed outside New York held
immaterial).
43 Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 457,
209 N.E.2d 68, 75, 261 N.Y.S2d 8, 18 (1965).
44 Id. at 457 n.5, 209 N.E.2d at 75 n.5, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.5.
45 CPLR 302(a) (1).
46 Curran v. Rouse Transp. Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 1055, 1057-58, 249
N.Y.S.2d 718, 720-21 (Sup. Ct 1964).
47 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1965).
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defendant and since the cause of action arose from the performance
of these activities in furtherance of the employment contract.
As was stressed in previous issues of the Survey, CPLR 302 offers
no objection to the assertion of jurisdiction in such a situation."8
In its discussion of minimum contacts, however, the court
stated that this question need only be answered when attempting
to satisfy the test for "doing business" under CPLR 301."9 Such
language should not be strictly construed by the practitioner. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not abrogated the
"minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,0
and it would seem obvious, therefore, that this requirement would
subsist under CPLR 302 (a) (1).
CPLR 302 (a) (2): Tortious act distinguished from
resultant injury.
The Court of Appeals, in two recent cases, has either settled
permanently the application of CPLR 302(a)(2) or has paved
the way for decisive legislative activity on a paragraph which
is perhaps the most important section in the CPLR.
In Feathers v. McLucas,-5 the defendant was a Kansas cor-
poration engaged in the manufacture of pressure tanks. A Missouri
corporation purchased one of these tanks and mounted it on a
wheel base. The completed assembly was thereafter sold to a
Pennsylvania corporation engaged in interstate commerce. While
passing through New York en route from Pennsylvania to
Vermont, the tank exploded, causing injury to the plaintiffs. In
sustaining jurisdiction, the appellate division stated that "the
legislature did not intend to separate foreign wrongful acts from
resulting forum consequences." 52  Thus, the negligent act of
manufacture could be said to have been committed in this state.
The Court of Appeals, emphasizing the distinction between tort
and tortious act, reversed, holding that CPLR 302 (a) (2) is directed
only at "a tortious act committed [by a nondomiciliary] in this
state." 53 On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant's
48 See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 Sr. JoHN's L.
REV. 178, 191 (1964).
4 Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 104-05, 258
N.Y.S2d 717, 718 (1st Dep't 1965).
5o 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; see Angelilli Const. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, Inc.,
45 Misc. 2d 171, 172-73, 256 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1964), wherein
it was stated that CPLR 302 "defines a class of 'minimum contacts' upon
which the courts of New York can obtain personal jurisdiction over non-
resident parties within the expanded area permitted . . . in International
Shoe. ... "
51 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
5221 App. Div. 2d 558, 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d Dept 1964).
5 3 Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E2d 68, 80, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965).
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